Abstract-Evolvable hardware (EHW) combines the powerful search capability of evolutionary algorithms with the flexibility of reprogrammable devices, thereby providing a natural framework for reconfiguration. This framework has generated an interest in using EHW for fault-tolerant systems because reconfiguration can effectively deal with hardware faults whenever it is impossible to provide spares. But systems cannot tolerate faults indefinitely, which means reconfiguration does have a deadline. The focus of previous EHW research relating to fault-tolerance has been primarily restricted to restoring functionality, with no real consideration of time constraints. In this paper, we are concerned with EHW performing reconfiguration under deadline constraints. In particular, we investigate reconfigurable hardware that undergoes intrinsic evolution. We show that fault recovery done by intrinsic reconfiguration has some restrictions, which designers cannot ignore.
I. INTRODUCTION
R ELIABLE systems can be depended on to provide continual service. Unfortunately, faults are inevitable, which leads to disruptions in service. One way of increasing a system's availability is to make it fault-tolerant-i.e., capable of detecting and recovering from hardware faults. Exchanging a faulty component with an operating spare is the most widely used method for hardware fault recovery [1] , but this method is not always practical. For instance, in some systems, mission essential equipment occupies all of the available space leaving no room for spare hardware. Another case is when system failure results from an unanticipated change in the operational environment. For example, high radiation environments can induce effects in metal-oxide-semiconductor devices [2] and high temperatures can lead to failures in voltage converters [3] . Simply replacing the original system with an identical copy accomplishes nothing if the environmental conditions have not changed.
Reconfiguring a faulty system eliminates the need for redundant hardware. Reconfiguration methodically changes the failed system's architecture until a desired functionality is restored. There is no guarantee full functionality can be restored in all cases. Nevertheless, reconfiguration is a viable fault recovery technique-especially when providing redundant hardware becomes impractical. The work presented in this paper concentrates on those fault tolerant systems that cannot use redundant hardware for fault recovery and are, therefore, forced to use reconfiguration. Spacecraft or unmanned air vehicles are good examples; both have little room for spare hardware and they must operate in potentially hostile environments.
Evolvable hardware (EHW) has emerged as a powerful method for doing original hardware design-which naturally suggests it could be equally useful for doing hardware reconfiguration. The idea behind EHW is to combine the biologically inspired search methods of evolutionary algorithms (EAs) with the flexibility of reconfigurable hardware. The EA searches throughout the space of all possible configurations looking for the one that performs the best. Every configuration the EA finds must be evaluated and there are two accepted methods: extrinsic evolution where the evaluation is done in software, and intrinsic evolution where the evaluation is done on a hardware implementation. In many instances, intrinsic evolution is necessary because the only real way to evaluate a configuration is to implement it and have it actually operate in the physical environment. Intrinsic reconfiguration refers to any search process that uses intrinsic evolution to find new hardware configurations.
Three types of devices are suitable reconfigurable architectures: the field programmable gate array (FPGA) for digital applications; the field programmable analog array (FPAA) for analog applications; and the field programmable transistor array (FPTA) that can be used in either analog or digital applications. These devices represent different levels of granularity. Both the FPGA and FPAA provide configurable blocks of circuitry along with programmable routing resources. Conversely, the FPTA consists of an array of MOSFET transistors interconnected via programmable switches. A small number of capacitors are included on-chip, but resistors are synthesized using the MOSFET transistors. FPGAs and FPAAs are available as commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) devices (e.g., see [4] and [5] ; the FPTA was fabricated for NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory and is currently only available for research studies [6] .
Some recent work has shown EHW can be quite effective for reconfiguring existing hardware to overcome faults [7] - [9] , [21] . The ability of EAs to find good reconfigurations is not at issue in this paper. We instead are concerned with the issue of time. Most EHW-based studies rely on device simulators rather than physical hardware. This simulator use means the time to download a configuration, the time to program the device, and the time to conduct a fitness evaluation on the reconfigured hardware has largely been ignored-even though they dramatically affect the EA's running time.
Systems cannot operate indefinitely with faults. It should be obvious that timing constraints must be considered whenever evolutionary fault recovery is used. Why then do researchers ignore them? EHW researchers who study fault tolerant systems almost exclusively focus on just restoring functionality [10] . The EA running time is usually reported as either a maximum time or as an average time taken over many runs. Average running time does not guarantee compliance with a hard recovery deadline. Even the maximum running time is worthless because there is no guarantee some future run won't take even longer. For some reason running times and recovery deadlines are not compared.
Designers must contemplate a variety of factors before choosing a fault recovery method. This paper describes the advantages and limitations of intrinsic reconfiguration so designers can make an informed choice. In addition, several recommendations about the best ways to use intrinsic reconfiguration for fault recovery are included. No new methods to speed up the evolution are discussed. The reader should understand intrinsic reconfiguration properties are not application dependent and are not restricted to any particular type of EA. Those properties are the central theme of this paper. Optimization issues are handled more appropriately within the context of a specific problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II compares extrinsic and intrinsic reconfiguration and explains why the latter is usually the only option for fault recovery. Section III gives a brief introduction to real-time systems (RTS) and shows why fault-tolerant systems are real-time. Section IV derives a formula for estimating the intrinsic reconfiguration time and gives some examples to show reconfiguration time can be surprisingly long. Section V presents guidelines for future development of fault recovery systems that employ intrinsic reconfiguration. Finally, some practical issues involving intrinsic reconfiguration are given in Section VI.
II. WHY INTRINSIC RECONFIGURATION?
We are concentrating on autonomous fault tolerant systems-i.e., systems that can detect, isolate, and ultimately recover from a fault without any human intervention. Whenever EHW is used for fault recovery, the evolution can be done either intrinsically with physical hardware or extrinsically with hardware simulations. Is one method better than the other? We believe for truly autonomous fault tolerant systems only the intrinsic method makes any sense for two reasons.
1) Lack of in-situ computing resources:
Most EHW research is conducted in laboratories using Pentium PCs or UNIX workstations-resources not usually installed on a deepspace probe heading toward the planet Neptune! The severe lack of space also precludes using pipelined hardware or multiple processors that could speed up the processing. A more likely computing environment for reconfiguration operations in autonomous systems would be a single low-end microprocessor. Such a processor is relatively slow and can only address small amounts of memory, which affects the simulation runtime and the accuracy of the hardware models. Conversely, intrinsic reconfiguration does not use hardware models, so there are no modeling inaccuracies. Low-end microprocessors are quite capable of running EAs used for EHW. In fact, compact genetic algorithms even run entirely on a single VLSI chip [11] . 2) Inherent inaccuracies in hardware simulations: A serious problem for a spacecraft is collision with orbital debris [12] . Unforeseen failures like these are hard to represent accurately in a simulation, and even then only if the precise nature of the failure is known. Unfortunately, getting accurate failure information is nearly impossible with truly autonomous systems, especially when the failure was caused by exogenous events such as collisions. Evolving a new hardware configuration with an incomplete or inaccurate simulation is futile. On the other hand, intrinsic reconfiguration never has to make simplifying assumptions because the evolving hardware is directly interfaced to the damaged system. Hence, there is no doubt about how much functionality is restored in the reconfigured system. The above discussion should not imply intrinsic reconfiguration has no disadvantages. Fault recovery is inherently a real time process-an idea largely ignored by the EHW community. We will shortly show that intrinsic reconfiguration can take surprisingly long. In fact, under certain circumstances it may take so long that it cannot be used for fault recovery! Our objective is to first show designers the limitations of intrinsic reconfiguration and second to provide the necessary tools for evaluating its potential as a fault recovery method. However, before discussing those issues the reader must understand what makes a system a real-time system.
III. REAL-TIME SYSTEMS
This section provides a brief introduction to real-time systems. Interested readers are referred to some of the excellent books on this topic for further information (e.g., see [13] ). We begin with a formal definition of a real-time system.
Definition: Real-time system-Any system that is both logically and temporally correct.
Logical correctness means the system satisfies all functional specifications. Temporal correctness means the system is guaranteed to perform these functions within explicit time frames. Fault-tolerant systems qualify as real-time systems because fault detection and fault recovery inherently have deadlines. That is, the fault must be detected within a certain period of time after it occurs, and the fault must be corrected within a certain period of time after it is detected. Fault recovery may also have an expected start time.
The notion of real-time is often interpreted to mean really fast. This interpretation is not correct. Real-time does not necessarily mean fast-and fast does not necessarily mean real-time. Suppose a document must be sent from Chicago to London, and two delivery systems are available: surface mail with a guaranteed three-day delivery time or e-mail with a guaranteed 5 minute delivery time. The e-mail delivery is orders of magnitude faster than surface mail, but that does not necessarily mean it qualifies as a real-time delivery system. It is the required delivery deadline that ultimately establishes whether the real-time system definition has been met. For example, both systems are real-time systems if the deadline is six days because both are logically and temporally correct. However, neither one is a real-time system if the deadline is 3 minutes because neither one is temporally correct.
Real-time systems are classified as hard or soft. Hard systems have catastrophic consequences if the temporal requirements are not met-up to and including complete system destruction. In fact, if the hard system is safety-critical, failure could lead to injury or even death. Conversely, soft systems only have degraded performance if the temporal requirements are not met. The classification of a fault-tolerant system, in particular, depends on the nature of the faults and the consequences for failing to detect and correct them in a timely manner. Suppose a fault results in an over-temperature condition. If the system hardware can survive this condition for up to 5 minutes, then fault recovery must be completed within 5 minutes to prevent further damage. This would be a hard fault-tolerant system. On the other hand, if the fault only causes a minor loss of some sensor data, fault recovery could take considerably longer without dire consequences. This would be a soft fault-tolerant system.
IV. QUANTIFYING RECONFIGURATION TIME
In this section, we derive a formula for estimating the intrinsic reconfiguration time and describe how the formula is used. The derivation assumes the hardware environment consists of a single processor-i.e., a microprocessor or microcontroller-interfaced to a single reconfigurable device. The processor is responsible for executing the EA, converting configurations into a proper file format, downloading the configuration to the device, and running fitness tests to evaluate the configuration. The processor may or may not be dedicated to reconfiguration. That is, the processor may be engaged with other tasks whenever reconfiguration is not being performed.
The EA manipulates a genome that encodes all of the information needed to create a hardware configuration. During each generation, offspring are created. However, with intrinsic evolution an offspring's fitness evaluation cannot begin until the configuration information is physically downloaded and the device is programmed. Let denote the time it takes to do this. Since downloads take place every generation, the download time per generation lasts seconds. If denotes the duration of the fitness test per individual, then is the fitness evaluation time per generation.
The value depends on the type of reconfigurable device-i.e., an FPGA, FPAA, or FPTA-whereas is application dependent because the test duration is determined by the scope of the fitness test. Every offspring consumes time units. It therefore follows that an EA running for generations, while producing offspring per generation, has an intrinsic reconfiguration time of (1) Of course says nothing about the quality of the circuits produced after generations. We will discuss reconfiguration quality at length in Section V and at that time show how it relates to . Table I shows the programming time for several reconfigurable devices. This programming time cannot be ignored, despite being rather small in most FPGAs, because EHW algorithms frequently have populations sizes in the hundreds and they run for thousands of generations. The two examples below will help explain this issue. (These examples are only meant to show how long it can take to complete an intrinsic reconfiguration. The quality of that reconfiguration is ignored for the moment.)
Example 1: An EP2A70 FPGA is intrinsically evolved by a generational genetic algorithm (GA). The population size is 200 and 1000 generations are processed. From Table I, . Then, the time spent just reprogramming the FPGA is or about 42 minutes. is responsible for the rather long search times often encountered in analog applications. For instance, suppose a proportional-derivative controller is implemented in an FPAA. A controller's fitness is found by applying a step input to the control system, and then measuring its settling time. The fitness evaluation lasts at least as long as the settling time does, which can be somewhat lengthy. Indeed, settling times of 2 minutes are not unheard of [14] . Under these circumstances, it will not take a very large population size nor a large number of generations to make an intrinsic reconfiguration run for hours or even days before finishing.
Example 2: An AN220E04 FPAA is used to compensate for aging effects in a control system responsible for positioning a satellite's communications antenna. The reconfiguration search is done by a generational GA run for 500 generations with a population size of 100. The system's step response is measured to determine if the compensation is correct. This step response test takes ms to conduct. Hence, , , and ms . Substituting into (1) yields hours.
V. DISCUSSION
Reconfiguration times are meaningless until they are put into context. Take Example 2 from the previous section as an example. Suppose brief communication sessions with the satellite are scheduled at 10 hour intervals. A session may be skipped, but skipping two sessions in a row is not permitted. If a fault is detected just prior to a scheduled session, and if the error results in missing the session, then the fault recovery deadline is 10 hours. This is the worst case scenario. 1 An almost 9 hour reconfiguration time may seem quite long, but in this case it is perfectly acceptable because . On the other hand, it would not be acceptable if communication sessions were scheduled at 6 hour intervals.
The only way to determine if there is a problem is to compare the reconfiguration time against the fault recovery deadline. This latter quantity is system dependent. No problem exists so long as the reconfiguration time is less than the recovery deadline.
This time comparison adds a new perspective on intrinsic evolution and, at the same time, imposes a new requirement. Reconfiguration becomes a real-time process whenever it is used as a fault recovery method. Consequently, it is no longer sufficient to just talk about how an EA was able to restore a circuit's functionality. These statements may show logical correctness, but without comparing the reconfiguration time against a deadline there is no proof of temporal correctness. Just reporting an algorithm's running time does not say anything about temporal correctness either. The key point is expressed by the following first principle:
No fault recovery method can legitimately proclaim efficacy until it is proven to be both logically and temporally correct.
The validity of this principle is easy to see. If the recovery method is not logically correct, then the problem cannot be fixed. If it is not temporally correct, then the problem cannot be fixed soon enough to prevent other things from going wrong. Without proving logical and temporal correctness, there is no basis for claiming a fault recovery method is effective.
It is easy to prove if a fault recovery method is logically correct-try it and see if it fixes the problem. Proving temporal correctness, however, is more complicated because it really depends on conducting a thorough failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) or fault tree analysis (FTA). This analysis should identify all potential faults and their effects on system performance [15] . One outcome of the failure analysis is the recovery deadlines. Temporal correctness is proven if a logically correct recovery is guaranteed to finish prior to the recovery deadline. (Unfortunately, no EHW-based fault recovery method is temporally correct. See Section VI for further a discussion.)
No attempt was made in this study to promote one reprogrammable device over another. In fact, the devices we chose to study were picked merely to show the broad range of what is available. There is, however, one caveat. Some reprogrammable devices, such as the ispPAC10, use technology. Hence, there is a limit to the number of times the device can be reconfigured. RAM-based devices should be used if the population size and/or the number of generations is large.
Up to this point, only the programming and fitness evaluation times has been considered. However, the time an EA takes to do all of the other tasks done each generation, such as conducting binary tournaments or performing -point crossover, is also important. The genome associated with a particular reprogrammable device is always the same, so the overhead associated with running the EA is roughly constant each generation regardless of the application. Let denote the constant overhead time. Then, a more accurate formula for the reconfiguration time is (2) As before, says nothing about solution quality. The important point we want to emphasize here is the overhead time does affect reconfiguration time. The overhead time depends on a variety of factors including how parents are chosen, the complexity of the reproduction operators, and so on. Additional time must be added to account for the time to convert each genotype into the proper file format needed for the download.
Greenwood et al. [10] suggested EAs designed for reconfiguration searches perform best if they have high selection pressure and if they emphasize mutation for reproduction. In principle, any type of EA could be used for a reconfiguration search, but from a practical standpoint genetic programming algorithms should be avoided. Genetic programming algorithms designed for EHW problems are put on large multiprocessor systems to abridge their long running time [16] , [17] . This becomes especially problematic for fault-tolerant systems because, if there is not enough room for redundant hardware, then there is not enough room for a large multiprocessor system either. It seems unlikely a full-fledged genetic programming search, run on a single processor, could finish quickly enough to meet a fault recovery deadline of only a few hours.
Finally, some devices can be partially reconfigured-i.e., configuration changes can be restricted to only small portions of the device. The idea is to identify the particular region in the bitstream which requires reconfiguration. A header is then wrapped around this bitstream data to identify the address at which to start reconfiguration [18] . Partial reconfiguration reduces . This reduction may be important in situations where and are of the same order of magnitude.
VI. PUTTING THEORY INTO PRACTICE
We assume the system is fully designed and it meets all functional specifications. The objective is now to find out how the system can fail and the resultant effects. This evaluation can be done in several ways and the interested reader can find more comprehensive information elsewhere (e.g., [19] contains an excellent introduction).
Systems are typically evaluated with one of the following methods.
• In a perfect world no fault recovery method would ever be used unless it is both logically and temporally correct. In principle, FMET can prove logical correctness-inject the fault and see if intrinsic reconfiguration prevents the effect from occurring. However, proving temporal correctness for intrinsic reconfiguration is another story. In reality, temporal correctness cannot be formally proven because intrinsic reconfiguration uses an EA. Since these algorithms are stochastic, independent runs will not always produce repeatable outcomes. 2 Hence, there is no way to guarantee that a fixed number of generations will always find a desired circuit configuration.
It is essential that a proper perspective be kept when evaluating temporal correctness. Equation (2) must be used in the correct way. A designer should not run the EHW algorithm and then compare it against the recovery time to verify temporal correctness. This is backward. A designer should start with the recovery time, determined from an FEMA or FTA, and then use (2) to figure out how many generations are available to perform the intrinsic reconfiguration. In other words, do not run the EHW algorithm and then compare it against the recovery time. Instead, take the recovery time and then figure out how many generations can be processed. The EHW-based method has to be evaluated on what it can produce within this number of generations. If the final reconfiguration is not good enough, and the reconfiguration cannot be done in stages, then some other fault recovery method should be chosen.
Even if temporal correctness cannot be proven, intrinsic reconfiguration should automatically be rejected as a fault recovery method. It is also a reality that no system is perfect and always capable of performing when called upon. Systems do fail, so all recovery methods-whether or not they use EAs-have a finite probability of not executing and, thus, not being temporally correct. Consequently, the primary concern is to reduce the likelihood of failure. All a designer can do is minimize the failure risk to an acceptable level. There are ways to minimize risk when using intrinsic reconfiguration, but that depends on whether the fault is anticipated or unanticipated.
A. Minimizing Risk With Anticipated Faults
Anticipated faults are those faults identified while conducting a FMEA or FTA. These faults are precisely known and their effects are observed. Moreover, the fault recovery time is known because the analysis tells the time delay between the fault and its effect. One nice feature of anticipated faults is there is no need to evolve anything in-situ. A logically correct configuration found ahead of time can be stored in memory prior to deploying the system. Whenever the fault occurs, simply download the prestored configuration. Under these circumstances, temporal correctness is trivially achieved because the reprogramming time is quite small (see Table I ).
It was stated above that a FMET will verify logical correctness. But the first thing-before even conducting the FMET-is to see if intrinsic reconfiguration has any chance of meeting a recovery deadline. Here, simulation can be useful. 3 Once the fault is identified a designer can envision the type of circuitry needed for fault correction. The designer could construct an EA to search for hardware configurations and the simulator can evaluate them. It is not necessary to find the exact desired configuration because the goal is only to approximate the EA running time. Hence, the search can terminate when a sufficiently close enough configuration is found. Equation (2) will estimate the physical hardware reconfiguration time which can then be compared against the fault recovery deadline. This procedure will quickly show if intrinsic reconfiguration is feasible.
The FMET should be conducted if and only if the reconfiguration time is less than the recovery deadline. The best way to minimize any risk is to allow sufficient slack time. In other words, the intrinsic reconfiguration should end well short of the recovery deadline. The definition of "well short" of course depends on the system and the consequences of missing the recovery deadline. In safety-critical systems-i.e. systems where failure can lead to total system destruction, physical injury, or even death-the recovery deadline should be several times longer than the reconfiguration time. That requirement can be relaxed for systems that are not safety-critical, but reducing the reconfiguration time will always decrease the risk. This means the designer must know what constitutes an acceptable level of risk before specifying the maximum reconfiguration time.
In a few special cases, the failure risk can be reduced by doing the recovery in increments. This approach is used in some on-board preventive maintenance programs [20] . The main idea is to do fault recovery in stages. In other words, during each stage, which is a fixed time period, intrinsic reconfiguration is only expected to find a somewhat improved solution. Each stage restores a little bit more of the lost performance. This incremental improvement delays the ultimate fault effect, thereby giving the recovery method even more time to fix the problem. The EA uses the final population from the previous stage as the initial population in the current stage. The (still faulty) system has degraded performance, but it remains online between stages. This process continues until full recovery is achieved.
There will be some cases where no recovery method-except replacing the faulty system with an operational space-can correct a fault before the recovery time expires. Intrinsic reconfiguration should then attempt to evolve a "benign configuration," where faults can be contained and controlled. Only limited functions may be available, but at least this benign configuration helps prevent further damage from occurring until there is time to conduct more comprehensive repair operations.
Redundancy plays an important role in fault tolerance and it can be especially useful against anticipated faults. The main idea is this: instead of evolving a single circuit the designer evolves an ensemble of circuits, and then lets a majority vote decide the output. Each circuit in the ensemble would be intrinsically evolved during a FMET. However, just evolving a set of different (logically correct) circuits may not yield the best ensemble. Any correlation between the circuits lets a single fault affect several circuits, which makes error detection more difficult. So what is the best way to create an ensemble? Some recent work by Schnier and Yao [21] suggests an answer. During the EA run, they calculated an error pattern vector which indicates how well a circuit performs both with and without injected faults. A scalar product of two error pattern vectors gives the cross correlation between two circuits. By incorporating this correlation into the fitness function, the EA found circuits with a lower fault sensitivity. For that reason, the best circuits to pick for the ensemble are the ones with the lowest cross correlation.
No fault recovery procedure can remove all risk. This means other preventive steps may be necessary. See MIL-STD-882D for some additional risk mitigation measures [22] .
B. Minimizing Risk With Unanticipated Faults
Unanticipated faults are caused by unanticipated events, which are usually beyond a designer's control. Two types of unanticipated events are persistent, unexpected environmental changes or damage resulting from exogenous actions such as collision with orbital debris.
In many instances, the exact change in the environment or the extent of damage cannot be accurately determined. Consequently, unanticipated faults frequently have unpredictable effects. Without knowing the effect, it is impossible to state the recovery time; temporal correctness is no longer relevant. However, logical correctness may still be important but that can depend on the source of the unanticipated fault. In some cases, the definition of logic correctness will not change, while in other cases the definition will change.
A good example of where the definition can stay the same is compensating for changes in a component's characteristics due to changes in the operational environment [2] , [3] . New hardware configurations might exploit those changed characteristics to restore any lost functions. For example, Stoica et al. [6] successfully reconfigured a FPTA to restore functions lost due to temperature increases. Logical correctness always holds for these type of problems because the recovery objective is the same as it was for anticipated faults. That is, the goal is to completely restore all original system functions.
Exogenous events are a good example of where the definition of logic correctness may have to change. These events often create havoc with an operating system because there is no way to predict what faults will be induced; there is likewise no way to predict the ultimate effects. Consequently, logical correctness, at least with respect to a fault-free system, may be unattainable because there is no guarantee the available fault recovery method can deal with an unspecified failure mode.
It must be emphasized that "unanticipated" does not necessarily mean "unknown." Unanticipated can also mean "unplanned for" This is an important distinction which affects how logical correctness is redefined. An example will help make this distinction clear. Suppose a space probe is expected to encounter a high radiation environment. Certain precautions could be incorporated into the design to prevent any problems. For example, rad-hard components could be used and the enclosure could have special shielding installed. In this instance, the high radiation environment would be an anticipated event. However, if the designer believes the chances are slim of encountering a high radiation environment, then these precautions might not be put in perhaps to reduce costs. In other words, the high radiation environment was not planned for in the design. This means if the high radiation environment is subsequently encountered, it would qualify as an unanticipated event. What makes the distinction between unplanned for and unknown important is how logical correctness is redefined.
With unplanned for events it may be possible to relax the definition of logical correctness-i.e., full functionality does not have to be restored. Consider the communications antenna example discussed in Section V. The specifications may state the antenna will always be positioned to achieve some minimum signal strength at a receiving point. (This stated signal strength guarantees reliable communications.) Reconfiguration may never be able to position the antenna to get this signal strength back again, but it might be able to position it to get 25% of the desired signal strength. The communications will not be as reliable, but some communications is better than none. Logical correctness would be redefined to accept this lower limit.
There is one caveat worth mentioning: intrinsic reconfiguration that counteracts unplanned for events is always done after the system is placed into its operational environment. This situation means the EA's running time is shorter because some of the available recovery time is consumed by fault detection and isolation operations. One way to help circumvent this problem is to do the recovery in stages as described earlier.
With unknown events, the definition of logical correctness will most likely have to change. It is difficult to find the true extent of damage caused by an unknown event because there is little or no information about what happened. Under such circumstances, there is no guarantee any reconfiguration could fully restore lost functionality; some lower level of performance may have to be accepted. In the worst case, the corrective action switches from restoring system functions to guaranteeing system survival-which completely contradicts the normal interpretation of logical correctness in a fault tolerant system. Intrinsic reconfiguration would just search for a stable system configuration that stops any fault migration. For example, compensators can keep a system stabilized even when a sensor or actuator completely fails [23] . Any other recovery actions must wait until the damaged system is taken offline.
We conclude this section with the following observations. 1) Deterministic recovery methods are designed to handle only a very specific set of faults. They therefore have almost no ability to deal with unanticipated faults-especially faults caused by exogenous events. On the other hand, intrinsic reconfiguration can evolve novel circuitry that a designer never considered. In this realm, we believe intrinsic reconfiguration has the most potential as a fault recovery method. 2) Temporal correctness is ignored under certain circumstances. Does this mean the first principle of fault recovery is invalid? Not at all. The first principle always holds when recovery is from an anticipated fault. The reason is an anticipated fault can be thoroughly analyzed to determine its effect and recovery time; temporal correctness requirements are, therefore, clearly defined. Conversely, unanticipated faults were never analyzed, so any discussions about recovery time are meaningless. Temporal correctness cannot be defined in these cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
EHW-based reconfiguration is a viable method of performing fault recovery in systems without redundant hardware. Fault-tolerant systems are real-time systems. Consequently, any attempts to intrinsically evolve a new hardware configuration must consider the device programming time, the fitness evaluation time, and the EA overhead time because they all contribute to the reconfiguration time.
It has been shown that neither a large population size nor thousands of generations are necessary to have reconfiguration searches with surprisingly long finishing times. However, a long search time by itself is not enough to reject reconfiguration as a fault recovery method. Intrinsic reconfiguration can be used for fault recovery so long as it finishes before the mandatory recovery deadline. In some cases, it may be possible to do the recovery in stages rather than all at once.
Finally, a first principle for fault recovery was given. All intrinsic reconfiguration fault recovery methods are stochastic processes-which means they can never satisfy the first principle because temporal correctness cannot be satisfied. This does not mean intrinsic reconfiguration cannot be used be fault recovery. The designer just needs to be aware there is some risk involved. Intrinsic reconfiguration can be used so long as the designer believes the risk is acceptable.
